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Does	  the	  Universe	  Need	  God?	  Sean	  Carroll,	  California	  Institute	  of	  Technology,	  seancarroll@gmail.com	  
Draft:	  To	  appear	  in	  The	  Blackwell	  Companion	  to	  Science	  and	  Christianity,	  ed.	  James	  B.	  Stump	  and	  Alan	  G.	  Padgett,	  forthcoming. 	  	  “In	  the	  beginning,	  God	  created	  the	  heavens	  and	  the	  earth.”	  	  	  	   In	  many	  religious	  traditions,	  one	  of	  the	  standard	  roles	  of	  the	  deity	  has	  been	  to	  create	  the	  universe.	  	  The	  first	  line	  of	  the	  Bible,	  Genesis	  1:1,	  is	  a	  plain	  statement	  of	  this	  role.	  	  Much	  has	  happened,	  both	  in	  our	  scientific	  understanding	  of	  the	  universe	  and	  in	  the	  development	  of	  theology,	  since	  that	  line	  was	  first	  written.	  	  It’s	  worth	  examining	  what	  those	  developments	  imply	  for	  the	  relationship	  between	  God	  and	  cosmology.	  	   In	   some	  ways	  of	   thinking	  about	  God,	   there’s	  no	  relationship	  at	  all;	   a	   conception	  of	  divinity	  that	  is	  sufficiently	  ineffable	  and	  transcendent	  may	  be	  completely	  separate	  from	  the	  workings	   of	   the	   physical	   world.	   	   For	   the	   purposes	   of	   this	   essay,	   however,	   we	   will	   limit	  ourselves	  to	  versions	  of	  God	  that	  play	  some	  role	  in	  explaining	  the	  world	  we	  see.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  role	  of	  creator,	  God	  may	  also	  be	  invoked	  as	  that	  which	  sustains	  the	  world	  and	  allows	  it	   to	   exist,	   or	   more	   practically	   as	   an	   explanation	   for	   some	   of	   the	   specific	   contingent	  properties	  of	  the	  universe	  we	  observe.	  	  	  	   Each	  of	  these	  possibilities	  necessarily	  leads	  to	  an	  engagement	  with	  science.	  	  Modern	  cosmology	   attempts	   to	   come	   up	   with	   the	   most	   powerful	   and	   economical	   possible	  understanding	   of	   the	   universe	   that	   is	   consistent	   with	   observational	   data.	   It’s	   certainly	  conceivable	   that	   the	   methods	   of	   science	   could	   lead	   us	   to	   a	   self-­‐contained	   picture	   of	   the	  universe	   that	  doesn’t	   involve	  God	  in	  any	  way.	   	   If	  so,	  would	  we	  be	  correct	  to	  conclude	  that	  cosmology	   has	   undermined	   the	   reasons	   for	   believing	   in	   God,	   or	   at	   least	   a	   certain	   kind	   of	  reason?	  	   This	  is	  not	  an	  open-­‐and-­‐shut	  question.	  	  We	  are	  not	  faced	  with	  a	  matter	  of	  judging	  the	  merits	  of	  a	  mature	  and	  compelling	  scientific	  theory,	  since	  we	  don’t	  yet	  have	  such	  a	  theory.	  	  Rather,	  we	  are	   trying	   to	  predict	   the	   future:	  will	   there	  ever	  be	  a	   time	  when	  a	  conventional	  scientific	   model	   provides	   a	   complete	   understanding	   of	   the	   origin	   of	   the	   universe?	   	   Or,	  alternatively,	  do	  we	  already	  know	  enough	   to	  conclude	  that	  God	  definitely	  helps	  us	  explain	  the	  universe	  we	  see,	  in	  ways	  that	  a	  non-­‐theistic	  approach	  can	  never	  hope	  to	  match?	  	   Most	  modern	  cosmologists	  are	  convinced	   that	   conventional	   scientific	  progress	  will	  ultimately	   result	   in	   a	   self-­‐contained	   understanding	   of	   the	   origin	   and	   evolution	   of	   the	  universe,	   without	   the	   need	   to	   invoke	   God	   or	   any	   other	   supernatural	   involvement.1	   	   This	  conviction	  necessarily	  falls	  short	  of	  a	  proof,	  but	  it	  is	  backed	  up	  by	  good	  reasons.	  	  While	  we	  don’t	   have	   the	   final	   answers,	   I	  will	   attempt	   to	  explain	   the	  rationale	  behind	   the	   belief	   that	  science	  will	  ultimately	  understand	  the	  universe	  without	  involving	  God	  in	  any	  way.	  	  
The	  Universe	  We	  Know	  	   A	  century	  ago,	  we	  knew	  essentially	  none	  of	  what	  are	  now	  considered	  the	  basic	  facts	  of	   cosmology.	   	   This	   situation	   changed	   rapidly,	   first	   on	   the	   theoretical	   front	   in	   the	   1910’s,	  then	  on	  the	  observational	  front	  in	  the	  1920’s.	  	   Cosmology	  studies	  the	  universe	  on	  the	  largest	  scales,	  and	  over	  large	  scales	  the	  most	  important	  force	  of	  nature	  is	  gravity.	  	  Our	  modern	  understanding	  of	  gravity	  is	  the	  theory	  of	  general	  relativity,	  proposed	  by	  Einstein	  in	  1915.	   	  The	  key	  insight	   in	   this	  theory	  is	   the	  idea	  that	   space	   and	   time	   can	   be	   curved	   and	   have	   a	   dynamical	   life	   of	   their	   own,	   changing	   in	  response	   to	   matter	   and	   energy.	   	   As	   early	   as	   1917,	   Einstein	   applied	   his	   new	   theory	   to	  cosmology,	  taking	  as	  an	  assumption	  something	  we	  still	  believe	  is	  true:	   	   that	  on	   the	   largest	  scales,	   matter	   in	   the	   universe	   (or	   at	   least	   our	   observable	   part	   of	   it)	   is	   uniform	   through	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space.	   	   He	   also	   assumed,	   consistent	  with	   the	   apparent	   implication	   of	   observations	   at	   the	  time,	   that	   the	   universe	  was	   static.	   	   To	   his	   surprise,	   Einstein	   found	   that	   general	   relativity	  implied	   that	   any	   uniform	  universe	  would	  necessarily	   be	   non-­‐static	   –	   either	   expanding	   or	  contracting.	   	   In	   response	   he	   suggested	   modifying	   his	   theory	   by	   adding	   a	   new	   parameter	  called	   the	   “cosmological	   constant,”	  which	  acted	   to	   push	  against	   the	   tendency	   of	  matter	   to	  contract	  together.	   	  With	   that	  modification,	  Einstein	  was	  able	   to	  find	  a	  static	  (but	  unstable)	  solution	  if	  the	  cosmological	  constant	  were	  chosen	  precisely	  to	  balance	  against	  the	  attraction	  of	  matter	  on	  large	  scales.	  	   This	   discussion	   became	   somewhat	   academic	   when	   Edwin	   Hubble	   and	   Milton	  Humason	  announced	  in	  1929	  that	  the	  universe	  is	  expanding:	  	  distant	  galaxies	  are	  receding	  from	   us	   at	   speeds	   that	   are	   proportional	   to	   their	   distance.	   	   It	   had	   only	   been	   in	   1924	   that	  Hubble	  had	  established	  that	  the	  spiral	  nebulae,	  which	  many	  thought	  were	  clouds	  within	  our	  own	   galaxy,	  were	   separate	   galaxies	   in	   their	  own	  right,	  demonstrating	   the	   true	  vastness	  of	  the	  universe.	   	  	  The	  collection	  of	  stars	  we	  live	  in,	  the	  Milky	  Way	  galaxy,	  contains	  something	  over	   100	  billion	   stars,	   and	   there	   are	   over	   100	  billion	   such	   galaxies	  within	   the	   observable	  universe.	  	   If	  the	  universe	  is	  expanding	  now,	  it	  was	  smaller	  in	  the	  past.	  	  (More	  properly,	  galaxies	  were	  closer	   together	  and	   the	  universe	  was	  more	  dense;	   it’s	  possible	   that	   space	   is	  actually	  infinite	   in	   extent.)	   	   Using	   the	   rules	   provided	  by	   general	   relativity,	   and	   some	   assumptions	  about	   the	   types	   of	   matter	   and	   energy	   that	   pervade	   the	   universe,	   we	   can	   play	   the	   movie	  backwards	  in	  time	  to	  reconstruct	  the	  past	  history	  of	  our	  universe.	  	  Eventually	  –	  about	  13.7	  billion	  years	  ago,	  according	   to	  our	  best	   current	  estimates	  –	  we	  reach	  a	  moment	  of	   infinite	  density	  and	  spacetime	  curvature.	  	  This	  singularity	  is	  known	  as	  the	  “Big	  Bang.”	  	  Confusingly,	  the	   phrase	   “Big	   Bang	   model”	   refers	   to	   the	   entire	   history	   of	   the	   expanding	   universe	   that	  began	  in	  a	  hot,	  dense	  state,	   the	  broad	  outlines	  of	  which	  are	  established	  beyond	  reasonable	  doubt.	   	   In	  contrast,	   the	   “Big	  Bang	  event”	   is	  not	  really	  an	  event	  at	  all,	  but	  a	  placeholder	  for	  our	  lack	  of	  complete	  understanding.	  	   While	  we	  don’t	  claim	   to	  understand	  the	  absolute	  beginning	  of	  the	  universe,	  by	  the	  time	  one	  second	  has	  elapsed	  we	  enter	  the	  realm	  of	  empirical	  testability.	   	  That’s	   the	  era	  of	  primordial	  nucleosynthesis,	  when	  protons	  and	  neutrons	  were	  being	  converted	  into	  helium	  and	  other	   light	  elements.	   	  The	  theory	  of	  nucleosynthesis	  makes	  precise	  predictions	  for	  the	  relative	  abundance	  of	  these	  elements,	  which	  have	  passed	  observational	  muster	  with	  flying	  colors,	   providing	   impressive	   evidence	   in	   favor	   of	   the	  Big	  Bang	  model.	   	  Another	   important	  test	  comes	  from	  the	  cosmic	  microwave	  background	  (CMB),	  the	  relic	  radiation	  left	  over	  from	  the	  moment	  the	  primordial	  plasma	  cooled	  off	  and	  became	  transparent,	  about	  380,000	  years	  after	  the	  Big	  Bang.	  	  Together,	  observations	  of	  primordial	  element	  abundances	  and	  the	  CMB	  provide	   not	   only	   evidence	   in	   favor	   of	   the	   basic	   cosmological	   picture,	   but	   stringent	  constraints	  on	  the	  parameters	  describing	  the	  composition	  of	  our	  universe.	  	  	  	   One	  implication	  of	  these	  data	  is	  that	  only	  about	  4%	  of	  the	  total	  energy	  of	  the	  current	  universe	   is	   in	   the	   form	   of	   “ordinary	   matter”	   –	   the	   atoms	   and	   molecules	   consisting	   of	  protons,	  neutrons,	  and	  electrons,	  as	  well	  as	  photons	  and	  neutrinos	  and	  all	  the	  other	  known	  elementary	   particles.	   	   Another	   23%	   of	   the	   universe	   is	   “dark	   matter”	   –	   a	   completely	   new	  kind	   of	   particle,	   as	   yet	   undiscovered	   here	   on	   Earth.	   	   In	   addition	   to	   constraints	   from	  nucleosynthesis	  and	  the	  CMB,	  strong	  evidence	  for	  dark	  matter	  comes	  from	  the	  dynamics	  of	  galaxies,	   clusters	  of	   galaxies,	  and	   large-­‐scale	   structure	   in	   the	  universe	   (see	  Komatsu	  et	   al.	  2001).	  	   This	   leaves	  us	  with	  73%	  of	   the	  universe	  in	  an	  even	  more	  mysterious	  form	  –	   “dark	  energy.”	  	  Once	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  universe	  was	  discovered,	  Einstein’s	  original	  motivation	  for	   introducing	   the	   cosmological	   constant	   evaporated.	   	   But	   the	   idea	   didn’t	   go	   away,	   and	  physicists	   later	  realized	  that	  this	  parameter	  had	  a	  very	  natural	  interpretation	  –	  the	  energy	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Theories	  of	  Creation	  	   The	  inability	  of	  established	  physics	  to	  describe	  the	  Big	  Bang	  event	  makes	  it	  tempting	  to	  consider	  the	  possibility	  that	  God	  has	  a	  crucial	  role	  to	  play	  at	  this	  unique	  moment	  in	  the	  history	  of	  the	  universe.	  If	  we	  were	  able	  to	  construct	  a	  complete	  and	  compelling	  naturalistic	  account,	   the	   necessity	   of	   appealing	   to	   God	   would	   be	   diminished.	   	   A	   number	   of	   avenues	  toward	   this	   goal	   are	   being	   explored.	   They	   can	   be	   divided	   into	   two	   types:	   “beginning”	  cosmologies,	   in	   which	   there	   is	   a	   first	   moment	   of	   time,	   and	   “eternal”	   cosmologies,	   where	  time	  stretches	  to	  the	  past	  without	  limit.	  	   There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  avenues	  currently	  being	  explored	  by	  physicists	  that	  hope	  to	  provide	   a	   complete	   and	   self-­‐contained	   account	   of	   the	   universe,	   including	   the	   Big	   Bang.	  	  Roughly	   speaking	   they	   can	   be	   divided	   into	   two	   types:	   “beginning”	   cosmologies,	   in	   which	  there	  is	  a	  first	  moment	  of	  time,	  and	  “eternal”	  cosmologies,	  where	  time	  stretches	  to	  the	  past	  without	  limit.	  	   “Beginning”	   cosmologies	   typically	   attempt	   to	   replace	   the	   Big	   Bang	   singularity	   of	  classical	  general	  relativity	  with	  some	  sort	  of	  quantum-­‐mechanical	  event,	  and	  often	  go	  by	  the	  name	   “quantum	   cosmology”	   (Hartle	   and	   Hawking	   1983,	   Vilenkin	   1984).	   	   These	   models	  imagine	   that	   spacetime	   is	   a	   classical	   approximation	   to	   some	   sort	   of	   quantum-­‐mechanical	  structure.	  	  (Even	  if	  we	  don’t	  have	  a	  complete	  theory	  of	  quantum	  gravity,	  the	  hope	  is	  that	  the	  basic	  features	  of	  quantum	  mechanics	  and	  general	  relativity	  are	  sufficiently	  robust	   that	  the	  details	   aren’t	   important	   for	   this	   particular	   question.)	   	   In	   particular,	   time	   may	   be	   just	   an	  approximate	  notion,	  useful	  in	  some	  regimes	  but	  not	  others.	  	  Near	  the	  Big	  Bang	  is	  an	  obvious	  candidate	   for	   an	   era	   in	   which	   time	   loses	   its	   conventional	   meaning.	   	   The	   important	  ingredient	   is	   then	   a	   “boundary	   condition”	   that	   describes	   the	   state	   of	   the	   universe	   at	   the	  moment	  when	   time	   is	   first	   an	   intelligible	   concept.	   	   The	  most	   famous	   example	   is	   the	   “no-­‐boundary	  proposal”	  of	  Hartle	  and	  Hawking,	  which	  constructs	   the	   state	  of	   the	  universe	  by	  integrating	   over	   all	   possible	   Euclidean	   geometries	   with	   no	   other	   boundaries.	   	   By	  “Euclidean”	  we	  mean	  geometries	  in	  which	  all	  four	  dimensions	  are	  spatial,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  “Lorentzian”	   geometry	   of	   spacetime	   with	   its	   distinction	   between	   timelike	   and	   spacelike	  directions.	   	   One	   occasionally	   speaks	   of	   “imaginary	   time,”	   a	   phrase	   that	   has	   probably	   not	  increased	  the	  total	  amount	  of	  understanding	  in	  the	  universe.	  	   A	  provocative	  way	  of	  characterizing	  these	  beginning	  cosmologies	  is	  to	  say	  that	  “the	  universe	  was	  created	  from	  nothing.”	  	  Much	  debate	  has	  gone	  into	  deciding	  what	  this	  claim	  is	  supposed	  to	  mean.	  	  Unfortunately,	  it	  is	  a	  fairly	  misleading	  natural-­‐language	  translation	  of	  a	  concept	   that	   is	   not	   completely	   well-­‐defined	   even	   at	   the	   technical	   level.	   Terms	   that	   are	  imprecisely	   defined	   include	   “universe,”	   “created,”	   “from,”	   and	   “nothing.”	   	   (We	   can	   argue	  about	  “was.”)	  	   The	   problem	   with	   “creation	   from	   nothing”	   is	   that	   it	   conjures	   an	   image	   of	   a	   pre-­‐existing	  “nothingness”	  out	  of	  which	  the	  universe	  spontaneously	  appeared	  –	  not	  at	  all	  what	  is	  actually	   involved	   in	   this	   idea.	   	   Partly	   this	   is	   because,	   as	   human	   beings	   embedded	   in	   a	  universe	  with	  an	  arrow	  of	  time,	  we	  can’t	  help	  but	   try	  to	  explain	  events	   in	  terms	  of	  earlier	  events,	  even	  when	   the	  event	  we	   are	   trying	   to	  explain	   is	  explicitly	   stated	   to	  be	   the	  earliest	  one.	   	   It	  would	  be	  more	  accurate	   to	  characterize	   these	  models	  by	  saying	   “there	  was	  a	   time	  such	  that	  there	  was	  no	  earlier	  time.”	  	  	  	   To	  make	  sense	  of	  this,	  it	  is	  helpful	  to	  think	  of	  the	  present	  state	  of	  the	  universe	  and	  work	   backwards,	   rather	   than	   succumbing	   to	   the	   temptation	   to	   place	   our	   imaginations	  “before”	   the	   universe	   came	   into	   being.	   	   The	   beginning	   cosmologies	   posit	   that	   our	  mental	  journey	  backwards	  in	  time	  will	  ultimately	  reach	  a	  point	  past	  which	  the	  concept	  of	  “time”	  is	  no	  longer	  applicable.	  Alternatively,	   imagine	  a	  universe	  that	  collapsed	  into	  a	  Big	  Crunch,	  so	  that	   there	   would	   be	   a	   future	   end	   point	   to	   time.	   	   	   We	   aren’t	   tempted	   to	   say	   that	   such	   a	  universe	   “transformed	   into	   nothing”;	   it	   simply	   has	   a	   final	  moment	   of	   its	   existence.	   	  What	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Why	  This	  Universe?	  	   In	  recent	  years,	  a	  different	  aspect	  of	  our	  universe	  has	  been	  seized	  upon	  by	  natural	  theologians	  as	  evidence	  for	  God’s	  handiwork	  –	  the	  purported	  fine-­‐tuning	  of	  the	  physical	  and	  cosmological	   parameters	   that	   specify	   our	   particular	   universe	   among	   all	   possible	   ones.	  	  These	  parameters	  are	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  laws	  of	  physics	  (the	  mass	  of	  the	  electron,	  the	  value	  of	  the	  vacuum	  energy)	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  history	  of	  the	  universe	  (the	  amount	  of	  dark	  matter,	  the	  smoothness	  of	  the	  initial	  state).	  	  There’s	  no	  question	  that	  the	  universe	  around	  us	  would	  look	   very	   different	   if	   some	   of	   these	   parameters	   were	   changed	   (Rees	   1999).	   	   The	  controversial	   claims	   are	   two:	   that	   intelligent	   life	   can	   only	   exist	   for	   a	   very	   small	   range	   of	  parameters,	  in	  which	  our	  universe	  just	  happens	  to	  find	  itself;	  and	  that	  the	  best	  explanation	  for	  this	  happy	  circumstance	  is	  that	  God	  arranged	  it	  that	  way.	  	   The	  clearest	  example	  of	  apparent	  fine-­‐tuning	  is	   the	  vacuum	  energy	   (Carroll	  2001).	  	  As	   discussed	   above,	   vacuum	   energy	   is	   the	   leading	   candidate	   for	   the	   dark	   energy	   causing	  distant	   galaxies	   to	  accelerate;	  but	  even	   if	   the	  vacuum	  energy	   is	   exactly	   zero	  and	   the	   dark	  energy	   is	   something	   else,	   we	   can	   safely	   say	   that	   the	   value	   of	   the	   vacuum	   energy	   is	   not	  greater	  than	  that	  of	  the	  dark	  energy,	  about	  10-­‐8	  ergs	  per	  cubic	  centimeter.	  	  Using	  techniques	  from	   quantum	   field	   theory,	   we	   can	   do	   a	   rough	   calculation	   of	   what	   we	   would	   expect	   the	  vacuum	   energy	   to	   be,	   if	  we	  hadn’t	   already	  measured	   it.	   	   The	   answer	   is	   quite	   a	   bit	   larger:	  about	  10112	  ergs	  per	  cubic	  centimeter.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  actual	  value	  of	  the	  vacuum	  energy	  is	  at	  least	  120	  orders	  of	  magnitude	  smaller	  than	  its	  natural	  value	  is	  a	  fine-­‐tuning	  by	  anyone’s	  estimation.	  	  	  	   Cosmologists	  don’t	  have	  a	  compelling	  model	  for	  why	  the	  vacuum	  energy	  is	  so	  much	  smaller	  than	  it	  should	  be.	  	  But	  if	  it	  were	  anywhere	  near	  its	  “natural”	  value,	  we	  would	  not	  be	  here	  talking	  about	  it.	  	  Vacuum	  energy	  pulls	  objects	  away	  from	  each	  other,	  and	  a	  value	  much	  larger	   than	  what	   is	  observed	  would	  prohibit	  galaxies	  and	   stars	   from	   forming,	  presumably	  making	  it	  harder	  for	  life	  to	  exist.	  	  	  	   Other	   constants	   of	   nature,	   such	   as	   those	   that	   govern	   atomic	   and	   nuclear	   physics,	  seem	  natural	  by	  themselves,	  but	  would	  give	  rise	  to	  very	  different	  macroscopic	  phenomena	  if	  they	  were	  changed	  even	  slightly.	  	  For	  example,	  if	  the	  mass	  of	  the	  neutron	  were	  a	  bit	  larger	  (in	  comparison	   to	   the	  mass	  of	   the	  proton)	   than	   its	  actual	  value,	  hydrogen	  would	  not	   fuse	  into	  deuterium	  and	  conventional	  stars	  would	  be	  impossible;	  if	  the	  neutron	  mass	  were	  a	  bit	  smaller,	  all	   the	  hydrogen	  in	  the	  early	  universe	  would	  fuse	  into	  helium,	  and	  helium	  stars	   in	  the	   late	  universe	  would	  have	  much	  shorter	   lifetimes	   (Hogan	  2000;	  Collins	  2003).	   	   (On	   the	  other	   hand,	   Adams	   has	   argued	   that	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   physical	   parameters	   leads	   to	   stars	  sustained	  by	  nuclear	  fusion	  (Adams	  2008).)	  	   In	  the	  face	  of	  these	  apparent	  fine-­‐tunings,	  we	  have	  several	  possible	  options:	  	   1. Life	   is	   extremely	   robust,	   and	   would	   be	   likely	   to	   arise	   even	   if	   the	   parameters	  were	  very	  different,	  whether	  or	  not	  we	  understand	  what	  form	  it	  would	  take.	  2. There	  is	  only	  one	  universe,	  with	  randomly-­‐chosen	  parameters,	  and	  we	  just	  got	  lucky	  that	  they	  are	  among	  the	  rare	  values	  that	  allow	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  life.	  3. In	  different	  regions	  of	  the	  universe	  the	  parameters	  take	  on	  different	  values,	  and	  we	   are	   fooled	   by	   a	   selection	   effect:	   life	   will	   only	   arise	   in	   those	   regions	  compatible	  with	  the	  existence	  of	  life.	  4. The	   parameters	   are	   not	   chosen	   randomly,	   but	   designed	   that	   way	   by	   a	   deity.	  	  	   Generally,	  not	   nearly	  enough	   credence	   is	   given	   to	   option	  #1	   in	   this	   list.	   	  We	  know	  very	  little	  about	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  complexity,	  and	  intelligent	  life	  in	  particular,	  can	  possibly	  form.	  	  If,	  for	  example,	  we	  were	  handed	  the	  Standard	  Model	  of	  particle	  physics	  but	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had	  no	  actual	  knowledge	  of	  the	  real	  world,	  it	  would	  be	  very	  difficult	  to	  derive	  the	  periodic	  table	   of	   the	   elements,	   much	   less	   the	   atoms	   and	   molecules	   on	   which	   Earth-­‐based	   life	  depends.	  	  Life	  may	  be	  very	  fragile,	  but	  for	  all	  we	  know	  it	  may	  be	  ubiquitous	  (in	  parameter	  space);	  we	  have	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  trouble	  even	  defining	  “life”	  or	  for	  that	  matter	  “complexity,”	  not	  to	  mention	  “intelligence.”	  	  At	  the	  least,	  the	  tentative	  nature	  of	  our	  current	  understanding	  of	   these	   issues	   should	   make	   us	   reluctant	   to	   draw	   grand	   conclusions	   about	   the	   nature	   of	  reality	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  our	  universe	  allows	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  life.	  	   Nevertheless,	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   playing	   along,	   let’s	   imagine	   that	   intelligent	   life	   only	  arises	  under	  a	  very	  restrictive	  set	  of	   circumstances.	   	  Following	  Swinburne	  (1990),	  we	  can	  cast	  the	  remaining	  choices	   in	   terms	  of	  Bayesian	  probability.	   	  The	  basic	   idea	  is	   simple:	   	  we	  assign	  some	  prior	  probability	  –	  before	  we	   take	  into	  account	  what	  we	  actually	  know	  about	  the	   universe	   –	   to	   each	   of	   the	   three	   remaining	   scenarios.	   	   Then	   we	   multiply	   that	   prior	  probability	  by	  the	  probability	  that	  intelligent	  life	  would	  arise	  in	  that	  particular	  model.	  	  The	  result	  is	  proportional	  to	  the	  probability	  that	  the	  model	  is	  correct,	  given	  that	  intelligent	  life	  exists.2	  Thus,	  for	  option	  #2	  (a	  single	  universe,	  no	  supernatural	  intervention),	  we	  might	  put	  the	  prior	  probability	  at	  a	  relatively	  high	  value	  by	  virtue	  of	  its	  simplicity,	  but	  the	  probability	  of	   life	  arising	   (we	   are	   imagining)	   is	  extremely	   small,	   so	  much	  so	   that	   this	  model	   could	  be	  considered	  unlikely	  in	  comparison	  with	  the	  other	  two.	  	   We	   are	   left	   with	   option	   #3,	   a	   “multiverse”	   with	   different	   conditions	   in	   different	  regions	   (traditionally	   called	   “universes”	   even	   if	   they	   are	   spatially	   connected),	   and	   #4,	   a	  single	  universe	  with	  parameters	  chosen	  by	  God	  to	  allow	  for	  the	  eventual	  appearance	  of	  life.	  	  In	   either	   case	   we	   can	   make	   a	   plausible	   argument	   that	   the	   probability	   of	   life	   arising	   is	  considerable.	  	  All	  of	  the	  heavy	  lifting,	  therefore,	  comes	  down	  to	  our	  prior	  probabilities	  –	  our	  judgments	   about	   how	   a	   priori	   likely	   such	   a	   cosmological	   scenario	   is.	   	   Sadly,	   prior	  probabilities	  are	  notoriously	  contentious	  objects.	  	   I	   will	   consider	   more	   carefully	   the	   status	   of	   the	   “God	   hypothesis,”	   and	   its	  corresponding	   prior	   probability,	   in	   the	   final	   section.	   	   For	   now,	   let’s	   take	   a	   look	   at	   the	  multiverse.	  	  
The	  Multiverse	  and	  Fine-­Tuning	  	   There	   are	   (at	   least)	   two	   popular	   mechanisms	   to	   obtain	   a	   multiverse.	   	   One	   is	   the	  many-­‐worlds	   or	   Everett	   interpretation	   of	   quantum	   mechanics;	   I	   won’t	   discuss	   this	   idea	  here,	   because	   the	   various	   “branches	   of	   the	  wave	   function”	   describing	   different	  worlds	   all	  share	   the	   same	  basic	   laws	  of	  physics.	  The	  other	  kind	  of	  multiverse	   is	   in	   some	   sense	  more	  prosaic,	   in	   that	   it	   simply	   posits	   regions	   of	   spacetime	   outside	   our	   observable	   horizon,	   in	  which	   conditions	   are	   very	   different	   –	   including,	   in	   principle	   and	   often	   in	   practice,	   the	  parameters	  specifying	  the	   laws	  of	  physics,	  such	  as	   the	  mass	  of	  the	  neutron	  or	   the	  vacuum	  energy.	  	   This	   latter	   scenario	   has	   garnered	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   attention	   in	   recent	   years,	   in	   part	  because	   it	   seems	   to	   be	   a	   natural	   outcome	   of	   two	   powerful	   ideas	   that	   were	   originally	  pursued	  for	  other	  reasons:	   	   inflationary	  cosmology,	  and	  superstring	   theory.	   	   Inflation	  uses	  the	  fact	  that	  dark	  energy	  makes	  the	  universe	  accelerate,	  but	  posits	  an	  initially	  small	  region	  of	  space	  filled	  with	  a	  temporary	  form	  of	  super-­‐dark-­‐energy	  at	  an	  enormously	  high	  density.	  	  This	   causes	   this	   small	   region	   to	   grow	   to	   fantastic	   size,	   before	   the	   dark	   energy	   ultimately	  decays.	  	  In	  many	  versions	  of	  the	  theory,	  the	  decay	  isn’t	  complete,	  and	  at	  least	  some	  region	  is	  always	   undergoing	   ultra-­‐fast	   inflationary	   expansion	   (Guth	  1998).	   	   From	   string	   theory	  we	  get	   the	   idea	   of	   a	   “landscape”	   of	   possible	   vacuum	   states.	   	   A	   “vacuum	   state”	   is	   simply	   a	  configuration	  of	  empty	  space	  with	  an	  associated	  set	  of	  physical	  laws.	  	  That	  is,	  what	  we	  think	  of	   as	   spacetime	   comes	   in	   a	   variety	   of	   phases,	   much	   like	  water	   can	   be	   in	   solid,	   liquid,	   or	  gaseous	   forms.	   	   In	   string	   theory	   there	   seems	   to	   be	   a	   mind-­‐boggling	   number	   of	   possible	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phases	  (over	  10500),	  each	  characterized	  by	  different	  physical	  constants,	  including	  the	  set	  of	  elementary	  particles	  and	   the	   number	  of	  macroscopic	  dimensions	  of	   space	   (Vilenkin	  2007;	  Susskind	  2006;	  Greene	  2011).	  	   The	   multiverse	   comes	   to	   life	   by	   combining	   inflation	   with	   string	   theory.	   	   Once	  inflation	  starts,	  it	  produces	  a	  limitless	  supply	  of	  different	  “pocket	  universes,”	  each	  in	  one	  of	  the	  possible	  phases	  in	  the	  landscape	  of	  vacuum	  states	  of	  string	  theory.	  	  Given	  the	  number	  of	  potential	   universes,	   it	   wouldn’t	   be	   surprising	   that	   one	   (or	   an	   infinite	   number)	   were	  compatible	   with	   the	   existence	   of	   intelligent	   life.	   	   Once	   this	   background	   is	   in	   place,	   the	  “anthropic	  principle”	  is	  simply	  the	  statement	  that	  our	  observable	  universe	  has	  no	  reason	  to	  be	   representative	   of	   the	   larger	   whole:	   we	   will	   inevitably	   find	   ourselves	   in	   a	   region	   that	  allows	  for	  us	  to	  exist.	  	   What	  prior	  likelihood	  should	  we	  assign	  to	  such	  a	  scenario?	  	  One	  popular	  objection	  to	  the	  multiverse	  is	  that	  it	  is	  highly	  non-­‐parsimonious;	  is	  it	  really	  worth	  invoking	  an	  enormous	  number	  of	  universes	   just	  to	  account	  for	  a	  few	  physical	  parameters?	   	  As	  Swinburne	   (1996,	  68)	  says:	  	   To	   postulate	   a	   trillion	   trillion	   other	   universes,	   rather	   than	   one	   God	   in	   order	   to	  explain	  the	  orderliness	  of	  our	  universe,	  seems	  the	  height	  of	  irrationality.	  	  	   That	   might	   be	   true,	   even	   with	   the	   hyperbole,	   if	   what	   one	   was	   postulating	   were	  simply	   “a	   trillion	   trillion	   other	   universes.”	   	   But	   that	   is	   a	   mischaracterization	   of	   what	   is	  involved.	   	  What	  one	  postulates	  are	  not	  universes,	  but	   laws	  of	  physics.	   	  Given	  inflation	  and	  the	   string	   theory	   landscape	   (or	   other	   equivalent	   dynamical	   mechanisms),	   a	   multiverse	  happens,	  whether	  you	  like	  it	  or	  not.	  	  	   This	   is	   an	   important	  point	   that	  bears	  emphasizing.	   	  All	   else	  being	  equal,	   a	   simpler	  scientific	  theory	  is	  preferred	  over	  a	  more	  complicated	  one.	  	  But	  how	  do	  we	  judge	  simplicity?	  It	   certainly	  doesn’t	  mean	   “the	  sets	   involved	   in	   the	  mathematical	   description	   of	   the	   theory	  contain	   the	   smallest	   possible	  number	   of	  elements.”	   In	   the	  Newtonian	  clockwork	  universe,	  every	  cubic	  centimeter	  contains	  an	  infinite	  number	  of	  points,	  and	  space	  contains	  an	  infinite	  number	   of	   cubic	   centimeters,	   all	   of	   which	   persist	   for	   an	   infinite	   number	   of	   separate	  moments	   each	   second,	   over	   an	   infinite	   number	   of	   seconds.	   	  Nobody	   ever	   claimed	   that	   all	  these	  infinities	  were	  a	  strike	  against	  the	  theory.	   	   Indeed,	   in	  an	  open	  universe	  described	  by	  general	  relativity,	  space	  extends	  infinitely	  far,	  and	  lasts	  infinitely	  long	  into	  the	  future;	  again,	  these	  features	  are	  not	  typically	   seen	  as	  fatal	   flaws.	   	   It	   is	  only	  when	  space	  extends	  without	  limit	   and	   conditions	   change	   from	   place	   to	   place,	   representing	   separate	   “universes,”	   that	  people	   grow	   uncomfortable.	   	   In	   quantum	  mechanics,	   any	   particular	   system	   is	   potentially	  described	  by	  an	  infinite	  number	  of	  distinct	  wave	  functions;	  again,	   it	   is	  only	  when	  different	  branches	   of	   such	   a	   wave	   function	   are	   labeled	   as	   “universes”	   that	   one	   starts	   to	   hear	  objections,	  even	  if	  the	  mathematical	  description	  of	  the	  wave	  function	  itself	  hasn’t	  grown	  any	  more	  complicated.	  	   A	  scientific	  theory	  consists	  of	   some	  formal	  structure,	  as	  well	  as	  an	   “interpretation”	  that	  matches	  that	  structure	  onto	  the	  world	  we	  observe.	  	  The	  structure	  is	  a	  statement	  about	  patterns	   that	   are	   exhibited	   among	   the	   various	   objects	   in	   the	   theory.	   	   The	   simplicity	   of	   a	  theory	   is	   a	   statement	   about	   how	   compactly	   we	   can	   describe	   the	   formal	   structure	   (the	  Kolmogorov	   complexity),	   not	   how	   many	   elements	   it	   contains.	   The	   set	   of	   real	   numbers	  consisting	  of	  “eleven,	  and	  thirteen	  times	  the	  square	  root	  of	  two,	  and	  pi	  to	  the	  twenty-­‐eighth	  power,	  and	  all	  prime	  numbers	  between	  4,982	  and	  34,950”	  is	  a	  more	  complicated	  set	   than	  “the	  integers,”	  even	  though	   the	   latter	  set	  contains	  an	  infinitely	   larger	  number	  of	  elements.	  	  The	  physics	  of	  a	  universe	  containing	  1088	  particles	  that	  all	  belong	  to	  just	  a	  handful	  of	  types,	  each	  particle	  behaving	  precisely	  according	  to	  the	  characteristics	  of	  its	  type,	  is	  much	  simpler	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than	   that	   of	   a	   universe	   containing	   only	   a	   thousand	   particles,	   each	   behaving	   completely	  differently.	  	   Likewise,	  a	  multiverse	   that	  arises	  due	   to	   the	   natural	   dynamical	   consequences	  of	  a	  relatively	   simple	   set	   of	   physical	   laws	   should	   not	   be	   discounted	  because	   there	   are	   a	   lot	   of	  universes	   out	   there.	   	   Multiverse	   theories	   certainly	   pose	   formidable	   problems,	   especially	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  making	  predictions	  and	  comparing	  them	  with	  data;	  for	  that	  reason,	  most	  scientists	   would	   doubtless	   prefer	   a	   theory	   that	   directly	   predicted	   the	   parameters	   we	  observe	   in	   nature	   over	   a	   multiverse	   ensemble	   in	   which	   our	   local	   environment	   was	  explained	   anthropically.	   	   But	   most	   scientists	   (for	   similar	   reasons)	   would	   prefer	   a	   theory	  that	  was	  completely	  free	  of	  appeals	  to	  supernatural	  agents.	  	  	  	   The	  multiverse	  is	  not	  a	  theory;	  it	  is	  a	  prediction	  of	  a	  theory,	  namely	  the	  combination	  of	  inflationary	  cosmology	  and	  a	  landscape	  of	  vacuum	  states.	  	  Both	  of	  these	  ideas	  came	  about	  for	  other	  reasons,	  having	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  the	  multiverse.	   	   If	   they	  are	  right,	   they	  predict	  the	   existence	   of	   a	  multiverse	   in	   a	  wide	   variety	   of	   circumstances.	   	   It’s	   our	   job	   to	   take	   the	  predictions	   of	   our	   theories	   seriously,	   not	   to	   discount	   them	   because	   we	   end	   up	   with	   an	  uncomfortably	  large	  number	  of	  universes.	  	   The	  multiverse,	   by	   itself,	   doesn’t	   offer	   an	   explanation	   for	   every	   cosmological	   fine-­‐tuning	  problem.	   	   If	   a	   parameter	   needs	   to	   be	   smaller	   than	   a	   certain	   value	   for	   life	   to	   exist,	  there’s	  no	  anthropic	  reason	  for	  it	   to	  be	  much	  smaller	  than	  that	  value.	  	  We	  therefore	  have	  a	  prediction:	  anthropically-­‐selected	  parameters	  should	  be	  of	  the	  same	  order	  of	  magnitude	  as	  the	   largest	   value	   compatible	   with	   the	   existence	   of	   life.	   	   Indeed,	   this	   prediction	   was	  successfully	  made	  by	  Steven	  Weinberg	  for	  the	  vacuum	  energy,	  over	  a	  decade	  before	  it	  was	  actually	  discovered	  (Weinberg	  1987).	  	   An	   example	   of	   fine-­‐tuning	  well	   beyond	   anthropic	   constraints	   is	   the	   initial	   state	   of	  the	   universe,	   often	   characterized	   in	   terms	   of	   its	   extremely	   low	   entropy	   (Penrose	   1989).	  	  Roughly	   speaking,	   the	   large	   number	   of	   particles	   in	   the	   universe	   were	   arranged	   in	   an	  extraordinarily	   smooth	   configuration,	   which	   is	   highly	   unstable	   and	   unlikely	   given	   the	  enormous	  gravitational	  forces	  acting	  on	  such	  densely-­‐packed	  matter.	  	  While	  vacuum	  energy	  is	  tuned	  to	  one	  part	  in	  10120,	  the	  entropy	  of	  the	  early	  universe	  is	  tuned	  to	  one	  part	  in	  ten	  to	  
the	  power	  of	  10120,	  a	  preposterous	  number.	  	  The	  entropy	  didn’t	  need	  to	  be	  nearly	  that	  low	  in	  order	   for	   life	   to	   come	   into	   existence.	   	   One	  way	   of	   thinking	   about	   this	   is	   to	   note	   that	   we	  certainly	  don’t	  need	  a	  hundred	  billion	  other	  galaxies	  in	  the	  universe	  in	  order	  for	  life	  to	  arise	  here	   on	   Earth;	   our	   single	   galaxy	   would	   have	   been	   fine,	   or	   for	   that	   matter	   a	   single	   solar	  system.	  	   That	   doesn’t	   mean	   that	   we	   can’t	   possibly	   explain	   the	   low	   entropy	   of	   our	   early	  universe	   by	   invoking	   the	   multiverse;	   it	   just	   means	   that	   the	   explanation	   must	   rely	   on	  detailed	  dynamical	   properties	   of	   the	  multiverse,	   rather	   than	   simply	   the	   requirement	   that	  life	   can	   exist.	   	   What	   we	   would	   need	   to	   show	   is	   that,	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   particular	  multiverse	   scenario	   under	   consideration,	  when	   life	   arises	   at	   all	   it	   typically	   does	   so	   in	   the	  aftermath	  of	  an	  extremely	  low-­‐entropy	  event	  like	  our	  Big	  Bang.	  	  This	  is	  a	  challenge,	  but	  not	  obviously	   an	   insuperable	   one,	   and	   researchers	   are	   actively	   tackling	   this	   question	   (Carroll	  2010).	  	  	   If	  anything,	  the	  much-­‐more-­‐than-­‐anthropic	  tuning	  that	  characterizes	  the	  entropy	  of	  the	  universe	  is	  a	  bigger	  problem	  for	  the	  God	  hypothesis	  than	  for	  the	  multiverse.	  	  If	  the	  point	  of	  arranging	   the	  universe	  was	   to	  set	   the	  stage	  for	   the	  eventual	  evolution	  of	   intelligent	   life,	  why	  all	   the	  grandiose	  excess	  represented	  by	  the	  needlessly	  low	  entropy	  at	  early	  times	  and	  the	  universe’s	  hundred	  billion	  galaxies?	  We	  might	  wonder	  whether	  those	  other	  galaxies	  are	  spandrels	  –	  not	  necessary	  for	  life	  here	  on	  Earth,	  but	  nevertheless	  a	  side	  effect	  of	  the	  general	  Big	   Bang	   picture,	   which	   is	   the	   most	   straightforward	   way	   to	   make	   the	   Earth	   and	   its	  biosphere.	   	   This	   turns	   out	   not	   to	   be	   true;	   quantitatively,	   it’s	   easy	   to	   show	   that	   almost	   all	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possible	   histories	   of	   the	   universe	   that	   involve	   Earth	   as	  we	   know	   it	   don’t	   have	   any	   other	  galaxies	  at	  all.3	  	  It’s	  unclear	  why	  God	  would	  do	  so	  much	  more	  fine-­‐tuning	  of	  the	  state	  of	  the	  universe	  than	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  necessary.	  
	  
Accounting	  for	  the	  World	  	   So	   far	   we’ve	   been	   discussing	   roles	   for	   God	   that	   match	   those	   of	   a	   conventional	  scientific	   theory	   –	   providing	   a	   clear	   and	   compelling	   account	   of	   the	   observational	   facts.	  	  There	  is	  another	  angle	  often	  taken	  by	  natural	  theologians	  in	  explaining	  God’s	  usefulness	  to	  cosmology:	  that,	  whatever	  the	  facts	  of	  the	  world	  might	  be	  and	  whatever	  patterns	  they	  might	  follow,	  only	  a	  divine	  being	  can	  offer	  a	  “reason	  why”	  things	  are	  that	  way,	  over	  and	  above	  the	  facts	  and	  patterns	  themselves.	  	   This	   approach	   takes	   a	   number	   of	   different	   forms.	   	   One	   is	   to	   give	   God	   credit	   for	  simply	  allowing	  the	  universe	  to	  exist:	  	   For	  Judeo-­‐Christianity,	  God	  is	  not	  a	  person	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  Al	  Gore	  arguably	  is…	  He	   is,	   rather,	   the	   condition	   of	   possibility	   of	   any	   entity	   whatsoever,	   including	  ourselves.	   He	   is	   the	   answer	   to	   why	   there	   is	   something	   rather	   than	   nothing.	  	  (Eagleton	  2006,	  32)	  	  	  Another	   is	   to	   sustain	   the	   existence	   of	   the	   universe.	   	   In	   response	   to	   Hawking’s	   question	  “What	  place,	  then,	  for	  a	  creator?”,	  John	  Polkinghorne	  (1994,	  73)	  answers:	  	   [I]t	  would	  be	  theologically	  naïve	  to	  give	  any	  answer	  other	  than:	  “Every	  place	  –	  as	  the	  sustainer	  of	  the	  self-­‐sustained	  spacetime	  egg	  and	  as	  the	  creator	  of	  its	  quantum	  laws.”	  	  Along	  similar	  lines,	  God	  is	  sometimes	  credited	  with	  maintaining	  the	  regularities	  observed	  in	  nature,	  which	  would	  otherwise	  simply	  be	  a	  coincidence.	  	   The	  same	  laws	  of	  nature	  govern	  the	  most	  distant	  galaxies	  we	  can	  observe	  through	  our	  telescopes	  as	  operate	  on	  earth,	  and	  the	  same	  laws	  govern	  the	  earliest	  events	  in	  time	  to	  which	  we	  can	  infer	  as	  operate	  today…	  If	  there	  is	  no	  cause	  of	  this,	  it	  would	  be	  a	  most	  extraordinary	  coincidence	  –	  too	  extraordinary	  for	  any	  rational	  person	  to	  believe.	  	  (Swinburne	  1996,	  49)	  	  A	  final	  example	  comes	  from	  the	  traditional	  “cosmological”	  arguments	  for	  God’s	  existence.	  	  In	  the	  “Kalam”	  formulation	  championed	  by	  William	  Lane	  Craig	  (1979),	  the	  first	  premise	  of	  the	  argument	   states	   “everything	   that	   has	   a	   beginning	   in	   time	   has	   a	   cause.”	   	   Things	   cannot	  simply	  begin;	  something	  must	  begin	  them.	  	   For	   convenience	   I	   am	   brutally	   lumping	   together	   quite	   different	   arguments,	   but	  hopefully	  the	  underlying	  point	  of	  similarity	  is	  clear.	  	  These	  ideas	  all	  arise	  from	  a	  conviction	  that,	   in	  various	  contexts,	   it	   is	   insufficient	   to	   fully	  understand	  what	  happens;	  we	  must	  also	  provide	   an	   explanation	   for	  why	   it	   happens	   –	   what	   might	   be	   called	   a	   “meta-­‐explanatory”	  account.	  	   It	  can	  be	  difficult	  to	  respond	   to	  this	  kind	  of	  argument.	   	  Not	  because	  the	  arguments	  are	  especially	  persuasive,	  but	  because	  the	  ultimate	  answer	  to	  “We	  need	  to	  understand	  why	  the	   universe	   exists/continues	   to	   exist/exhibits	   regularities/came	   to	   be”	   is	   essentially	   “No	  we	  don’t.”	   	   That	   is	   unlikely	   to	   be	   considered	   a	  worthwhile	   comeback	   to	   anyone	  who	  was	  persuaded	  by	  the	  need	  for	  a	  meta-­‐explanatory	  understanding	  in	  the	  first	  place.	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God	  as	  a	  Theory	  	   Religion	   serves	  many	  purposes	  other	   than	  explaining	   the	  natural	  world.	   	   Someone	  who	   grew	   up	   as	   an	   altar	   server,	   volunteers	   for	   their	   church	   charity,	   and	   has	   witnessed	  dozens	   of	   weddings	   and	   funerals	   of	   friends	   and	   family	   might	   not	   be	   overly	   interested	   in	  whether	  God	  is	   the	  best	  explanation	  for	   the	  value	  of	  the	  mass	  of	  the	  electron.	   	  The	  idea	  of	  God	  has	  functions	  other	  than	  those	  of	  a	  scientific	  hypothesis.	  	   However,	  accounting	  for	  the	  natural	  world	  is	  certainly	  a	  traditional	  role	  for	  God,	  and	  arguably	  a	  foundational	  one.	   	  How	  we	  think	  about	  other	  religious	  practices	  depends	  upon	  whether	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  world	  around	  us	  gives	  us	  a	  reason	  to	  believe	  in	  God.	  	  And	  insofar	   as	   it	   attempts	   to	   provide	   an	   explanation	   for	   empirical	   phenomena,	   the	   God	  hypothesis	  should	  be	  judged	  by	  the	  standards	  of	  any	  other	  scientific	  theory.	  	   Consider	  a	  hypothetical	  world	  in	  which	  science	  had	  developed	  to	  something	  like	  its	  current	   state	   of	   progress,	   but	   nobody	   had	   yet	   thought	   of	   God.	   	   It	   seems	   unlikely	   that	   an	  imaginative	  thinker	  in	  this	  world,	  upon	  proposing	  God	  as	  a	  solution	  to	  various	  cosmological	  puzzles,	  would	  be	  met	  with	  enthusiasm.	  	  All	  else	  being	  equal,	  science	  prefers	  its	  theories	  to	  be	  precise,	  predictive,	  and	  minimal	  –	  requiring	  the	  smallest	  possible	  amount	  of	  theoretical	  overhead.	   	   The	   God	   hypothesis	   is	   none	   of	   these.	   	   Indeed,	   in	   our	   actual	   world,	   God	   is	  essentially	  never	  invoked	  in	  scientific	  discussions.	   	  You	  can	  scour	   the	   tables	  of	  contents	   in	  major	   physics	   journals,	   or	   titles	   of	   seminars	   and	   colloquia	   in	   physics	   departments	   and	  conferences,	  looking	  in	  vain	  for	  any	  mention	  of	  possible	  supernatural	  intervention	  into	  the	  workings	  of	  the	  world.	  	   At	   first	   glance,	   the	   God	   hypothesis	   seems	   simple	   and	   precise	   –	   an	   omnipotent,	  omniscient,	   and	  omnibenevolent	  being.	   	   (There	  are	  other	   definitions,	  but	   they	  are	  usually	  comparably	   terse.)	   	   The	   apparent	   simplicity	   is	   somewhat	   misleading,	   however.	   	   In	  comparison	   to	   a	   purely	   naturalistic	  model,	  we’re	   not	   simply	   adding	   a	   new	  element	   to	   an	  existing	  ontology	  (like	  a	  new	  field	  or	  particle),	  or	  even	  replacing	  one	  ontology	  with	  a	  more	  effective	   one	   at	   a	   similar	   level	   of	   complexity	   (like	   general	   relativity	   replacing	   Newtonian	  spacetime,	  or	  quantum	  mechanics	  replacing	  classical	  mechanics).	  	  We’re	  adding	  an	  entirely	  new	  metaphysical	  category,	  whose	  relation	  to	  the	  observable	  world	  is	  unclear.	  	  This	  doesn’t	  automatically	  disqualify	  God	  from	  consideration	  as	  a	  scientific	  theory,	  but	  it	  implies	  that,	  all	  else	  being	  equal,	  a	  purely	  naturalistic	  model	  will	  be	  preferred	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  simplicity.	  	   There	  is	  an	  inevitable	  tension	  between	  any	  attempt	  to	  invoke	  God	  as	  a	  scientifically	  effective	   explanation	   of	   the	  workings	   of	   the	   universe,	   and	   the	   religious	   presumption	   that	  God	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  person,	  not	  just	  an	  abstract	  principle.	  	  God’s	  personhood	  is	  characterized	  by	  an	  essential	  unpredictability	  and	  the	  freedom	  to	  make	  choices.	  	  These	  are	  not	  qualities	  that	  one	   looks	   for	   in	   a	   good	   scientific	   theory.	   	   On	   the	   contrary,	   successful	   theories	   are	  characterized	   by	   clear	   foundations	   and	   unambiguous	   consequences.	   	   We	   could	   imagine	  boiling	   God’s	   role	   in	   setting	   up	   the	   world	   down	   to	   a	   few	   simple	   principles	   (e.g.,	   “God	  constructs	   the	   universe	   in	   the	   simplest	   possible	   way	   consistent	   with	   the	   eventual	  appearance	  of	  human	  beings”).	  	  But	  is	  what	  remains	  recognizable	  as	  God?	  	  	  	   Similarly,	  the	  apparent	  precision	  of	  the	  God	  hypothesis	  evaporates	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  connecting	   to	   the	   messy	   workings	   of	   reality.	   	   To	   put	   it	   crudely,	   God	   is	   not	   described	   in	  equations,	   as	   are	   other	   theories	   of	   fundamental	   physics.	   	   Consequently,	   it	   is	   difficult	   or	  impossible	   to	  make	  predictions.	   	   Instead,	   one	   looks	   at	  what	   has	   already	  been	  discovered,	  and	   agrees	   that	   that’s	   the	  way	   God	  would	   have	  done	   it.	   	   Theistic	   evolutionists	   argue	   that	  God	   uses	   natural	   selection	   to	   develop	   life	   on	   Earth;	   but	   religious	   thinkers	   before	   Darwin	  were	  unable	  to	  predict	  that	  such	  a	  mechanism	  would	  be	  God’s	  preferred	  choice.	  	   Ambitious	   approaches	   to	   contemporary	   cosmological	   questions,	   such	   as	   quantum	  cosmology,	   the	  multiverse,	   and	   the	   anthropic	   principle,	   have	  not	   yet	   been	  developed	   into	  mature	  scientific	  theories.	   	  But	  the	  advocates	  of	  these	  schemes	  are	  working	  hard	  to	  derive	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testable	   predictions	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   their	   ideas:	   for	   the	   amplitude	   of	   cosmological	  perturbations	  (Hartle,	  Hawking,	  and	  Hertog	  2008),	  signals	  of	  colliding	  pocket	  universes	  in	  the	  cosmic	  microwave	  background	  (Aguirre	  and	  Johnson	  2009),	  and	  the	  mass	  of	  the	  Higgs	  boson	   and	   other	   particles	   (Feldstein	   et	   al.	   2006).	   	   For	   the	   God	   hypothesis,	   it	   is	   unclear	  where	  one	  would	  start.	  	  Why	  does	  God	  favor	  three	  generations	  of	  elementary	  particles,	  with	  a	  wide	  spectrum	  of	  masses?	  	  Would	  God	  use	  supersymmetry	  or	  strong	  dynamics	  to	  stabilize	  the	   hierarchy	   between	   the	   weak	   scale	   and	   the	   Planck	   scale,	   or	   simply	   set	   it	   that	  way	   by	  hand?	  	  What	  would	  God’s	  favorite	  dark	  matter	  particle	  be?	  	   This	   is	   a	   venerable	   problem,	   reaching	   far	   beyond	   natural	   theology.	   	   In	   numerous	  ways,	  the	  world	  around	  us	  is	  more	  like	  what	  we	  would	  expect	  from	  a	  dysteleological	  set	  of	  uncaring	   laws	   of	   nature	   than	   from	   a	   higher	   power	   with	   an	   interest	   in	   our	   welfare.	   As	  another	   thought	   experiment,	   imagine	   a	   hypothetical	   world	   in	   which	   there	   was	   no	   evil,	  people	   were	   invariably	   kind,	   fewer	   natural	   disasters	   occurred,	   and	   virtue	   was	   always	  rewarded.	   	  Would	  inhabitants	  of	  that	  world	  consider	  these	  features	  to	  be	  evidence	  against	  the	   existence	   of	   God?	   	   If	   not,	   why	   don’t	   we	   consider	   the	   contrary	   conditions	   to	   be	   such	  evidence?	  	   Over	  the	  past	  five	  hundred	  years,	   the	  progress	  of	  science	  has	  worked	  to	  strip	  away	  God’s	   roles	   in	   the	   world.	   	   He	   isn’t	   needed	   to	   keep	   things	   moving,	   or	   to	   develop	   the	  complexity	  of	  living	  creatures,	  or	  to	  account	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  universe.	  	  Perhaps	  the	  greatest	  triumph	  of	  the	  scientific	  revolution	  has	  been	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  methodology.	  Control	  groups,	   double-­‐blind	   experiments,	   an	   insistence	   on	   precise	   and	   testable	   predictions	   –	   a	  suite	  of	  techniques	  constructed	  to	  guard	  against	  the	  very	  human	  tendency	  to	  see	  things	  that	  aren’t	  there.	  	  There	  is	  no	  control	  group	  for	  the	  universe,	  but	  in	  our	  attempts	  to	  explain	  it	  we	  should	   aim	   for	   a	   similar	   level	   of	   rigor.	   	   If	   and	   when	   cosmologists	   develop	   a	   successful	  scientific	  understanding	  of	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  universe,	  we	  will	  be	  left	  with	  a	  picture	  in	  which	  there	   is	   no	  place	   for	   God	   to	   act	   –	   if	   he	   does	   (e.g.,	   through	   subtle	   influences	   on	   quantum-­‐mechanical	  transitions	  or	  the	  progress	  of	  evolution),	  it	  is	  only	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  unnecessary	  and	  imperceptible.	   	   	  We	  can’t	  be	  sure	  that	  a	  fully	  naturalist	  understanding	  of	  cosmology	  is	  forthcoming,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  doubt	  it.	  	  Two	  thousand	  years	  ago,	  it	  was	  perfectly	  reasonable	  to	  invoke	  God	  as	  an	  explanation	  for	  natural	  phenomena;	  now,	  we	  can	  do	  much	  better.	  	   None	  of	  this	  amounts	  to	  a	  “proof”	  that	  God	  doesn’t	  exist,	  of	  course.	  	  Such	  a	  proof	  is	  not	  forthcoming;	  science	  isn’t	  in	  the	  business	  of	  proving	  things.	  	  Rather,	  science	  judges	  the	  merits	  of	  competing	  models	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  simplicity,	  clarity,	  comprehensiveness,	  and	  fit	  to	  the	  data.	  	  Unsuccessful	  theories	  are	  never	  disproven,	  as	  we	  can	  always	  concoct	  elaborate	  schemes	   to	   save	   the	   phenomena;	   they	   just	   fade	   away	   as	   better	   theories	   gain	   acceptance.	  	  Attempting	  to	  explain	  the	  natural	  world	  by	  appealing	  to	  God	  is,	  by	  scientific	  standards,	  not	  a	  very	   successful	   theory.	   	   The	   fact	   that	  we	   humans	   have	   been	   able	   to	   understand	   so	  much	  about	   how	   the	   natural	   world	   works,	   in	   our	   incredibly	   limited	   region	   of	   space	   over	   a	  remarkably	  short	  period	  of	  time,	  is	  a	  triumph	  of	  the	  human	  spirit,	  one	  in	  which	  we	  can	  all	  be	  justifiably	  proud.	  	  SEAN	  CARROLL	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1	  See	  also	  Carroll	  2005,	  62.	   	  For	  a	  different	  view,	  see	  chapters	   in	  this	  volume	  by	  Don	  Page,	  Robin	  Collins,	  and	  Steve	  Barr.	  	  
2	   It’s	   not	   obvious	   that	   this	   line	   reasoning	   is	   valid.	   One	   could	   certainly	   imagine	   taking	   the	  position	   that	   our	   existence	   offers	   exactly	   zero	   information	   about	   the	   probability	   of	   any	  cosmological	   scenario,	   because	   if	   we	   didn’t	   exist	   we	   wouldn’t	   be	   here	   debating	   the	  alternatives.	  	  But	  for	  the	  moment	  we	  are	  playing	  along.	  	  
3	  Given	  laws	  of	  motion,	   the	  space	  of	  histories	  of	  the	  universe	  is	   isomorphic	  to	  the	  space	  of	  states	  at	   some	   fixed	   time.	   	  The	  entropy	   is	   the	   logarithm	  of	   the	  number	  of	  macroscopically	  similar	   states.	   	   The	   fact	   that	   we	   can	   imagine	   much	   higher-­‐entropy	   configurations	   of	   the	  universe	   today	  without	   disturbing	   the	  Earth	   (e.g.,	   by	   putting	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   universe	   into	  black	  holes)	  demonstrates	  that	  histories	  like	  ours	  are	  an	  incredibly	  tiny	  fraction	  of	  histories	  that	  give	  rise	  to	  something	  like	  our	  current	  Earth.	  
